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Abstract: This paper is a highly contextualised study of the political, diplomatic, 
economic and military relations between Romania and Libya during the regimes of 
Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and Nicolae Ceauescu, from the Libyan Revolution in 
September 1969 to the Romanian Revolution in December 1989. The analysis is 
based, in a significant amount, on the official archives of the Romanian 
Communist Party, as well as of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The 
study aims to integrate the ideological, economical and politico-diplomatic 
ambitions of the two leaders in the realities of the Cold War and the Middle 
Eastern conflict. 
Keywords: Romania, Libya, Cold War, oil, industry 
Background 
Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, two main aspects 
governed the stage of international relations: the constant struggle between the US 
and the USSR for supremacy and control over the other power’s sphere of 
influence – known as the Cold War – and the process of decolonization – through 
which peoples and nations tried to carve their own destiny. Within the Cold War, 
Romania emerged as a potential dissident inside the socialist camp, eager to enter 
the diplomatic stage as a neutral and reliable player. Out of the decolonization 
process, the Libyan state was established by the Allies in the wake of the Second 
World War, in order to dismantle the Italian colonial empire and to prevent any 
modification to the balance of power in the Mediterranean.  
After consolidating their power and transforming the state to suit their 
ideological blueprints, the Romanian Communists remained loyal to Moscow 
during the Hungarian Revolution in 1956. They were, thus, rewarded by the USSR 
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40 
in 1958 with the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Romania
1
. By the 
early 1960’s, the Communist leader of Romania, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, began 
distancing himself from Soviet influence, dismissing further interference by 
Moscow into Bucharest’s economy and internal affairs. His successor, Nicolae 
Ceauescu, came to power in 1965 at a time of détente between the Soviet Union 
and the United States and of relative internal stability for Romania, which allowed 
him to focus his attention to an international agenda
2
.  
Generally, after the proclamation of the Romanian Popular Republic in 
1947, Bucharest’s foreign policy revolved around supporting initiatives of the 
USSR and maintaining a latent commerce which, through the Sovrom system, 
eventually benefited Moscow. Romania’s presence in the Middle East was 
inherited from the previous regime and most of the actions involved liquidating 
previous contracts or recovering assets seized during the Second World War. 
After Ceauescu’s rise to power in 1965, Romania started to deepen its 
commercial ties with Middle Eastern countries, establishing new diplomatic 
relations with the rest of the newly-independent states. These included the ones 
with a pro-western attitude, some of which were ruled by monarchs (such as Iran 
or Morocco). Despite the obvious neglect of communist ideology, the new leader 
from Bucharest intended to attract new markets for Romanian industrial products 
and new providers for strategic resources like oil and natural gas
3
.
Following the complicated process of rallying Libya’s three historical 
provinces – Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan – to the idea of a unified state, the 
new king, Idris al-Sanussi, was still perceived as a British vassal and ruled over a 
feeble country dependent on international aid
4
. Libya’s potential grew after the 
discovery of oil and gas deposits in 1959, becoming a destination for Italian and 
British investments.  
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The presence of foreigners, along with the general corruption in the king’s 
administration led to general dissatisfaction with the regime
5
. Under the influence 
of Arab nationalism spread by Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Libyan Free 
Officer’s Movement overthrew king Idris on 1
st 
September 1969 in a bloodless 
coup. Colonel Muammar Gaddafi managed to establish himself as leader of the 
new Libyan Arab Republic and immediately sought to assert his country’s new 
international status by gaining position at the expense of the British and the 
Italians
6
. Both Nicolae Ceauescu and Muammar Gaddafi thus governed would-be 
rogue states which aimed at raising their countries from the status of mere cogs in 
the international mechanism of the Cold War.  
Early contacts and main setbacks 
When Libya declared independence on the 25
th
 of December 1951, 
Tripoli’s MFA sent a telegram to Bucharest calling for official recognition. The 
Romanian authorities ignored the request on the basis that Libya was host to 
foreign military bases. Its independence was therefore perceived as artificial or 
illegitimate.  
Later, in 1956, the communist leaders reassessed their position by 
attempting to engage the Libyan side in commercial ties via the Romanian 
economic agency in Cairo. They tried again, in July 1966, through an official 
delegation to Tripoli led by Valentin Steriopol – deputy Foreign Trade Minister – 
to sign a commercial agreement, unsuccessfully. The next year, the Romanian 
government became even more persistent, orchestrating a lobby campaign at the 
Libyan embassies in Beirut and Prague. Then, they pursued a direct negotiation 
between ambassadors in Rome on the 27
th
 of September 1967, in order to sign both 
energy and diplomatic deals. In spite of an agreement being signed in Rome, the 
Libyan government refused to ratify the treaties due to Romania’s official neutral 
stance during the Six Day War
7
.  
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In 1968, galvanized by the surge in international credibility after the 
condemnation of the events in Prague, Ceauescu further pressed the issue of 
diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Libya
8
. Commercial ties soon followed 
without any legal framework, exclusively through the export of some Romanian 
goods like textiles, shoes and foodstuff destined for the potentially attractive 
Libyan market
9
. The trade volume more than doubled shortly, from 34,4 million lei 
in 1968 to 70 million lei in 1969
10
. 
During the events which followed the revolution of September 1
st
 1969, the 
official press of the Romanian Communist Party described the events as a 
bloodless military coup. It placed the presence of foreign military bases and the 
continuous underdevelopment of the tribal society as causes of the officers’ 
intervention
11
. As the events unfolded, the official newspaper began to criticize the 
former king’s association with the British and to appreciate the new regime’s 
intentions to reduce poverty and work on a more equitable redistribution of oil 
venues, from the international companies to the Libyan people
12
.  
New lobby actions were organized by the Romanian MFA after the 1969 
revolution at the Libyan representatives in Cairo, Beirut, Ankara, Belgrade and 
New York. All of these efforts were rejected by the new leadership in Tripoli
13
. 
Even with the fact that Colonel Gaddafi’s ideology was steering left and promoting 
an Arab version of Socialism
14
, the initiation of diplomatic relations between 
Bucharest and Tripoli’s new regime was improbable throughout the first years 
after the September revolution. This was due to Romania’s decision on 17
th
 of 
August 1969 to raise its diplomatic representation with Israel to an embassy level. 
As a reaction, Sudan and Syria broke off diplomatic relations with Bucharest, 
while Egypt and Iraq reduced their representation level in the Romanian capital
15
.  
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The Libyan leaders were also sceptical about prospective relations with 
satellite states of the USSR, whom they viewed as a disruptive force in the Arab 
world, especially in Iraq. Furthermore, Gaddafi’s new brand of Arab Socialism 
was meant to be an alternative to Soviet-style communism, which was seen as 
unacceptable because of its atheism
16
.  
After the September revolution, Muammar Gaddafi, the newly appointed 
Libyan leader, had to deliver on the promises of a better living for the common 
people and of gaining control of the national resources. This was particularly 
difficult due to the fact that oil was the only significant resource available, with 
almost no industry or infrastructure. The oil fields were leased to western 
companies by the former regime with significant advantages for the contractors
17
.  
The series of ultimatums given by Gaddafi in 1971 to the international oil 
companies present in Libya were synchronized by secret accords with those of Iraq 
and Algeria and led to what was to become the First Oil Crisis. By raising taxes for 
foreign companies and the royalties from oil exploits, Libya significantly improved 
its revenues and gained notoriety among the western world
18
. This discouraged 
European and American investments in the critical infrastructure and industry 
sectors. Furthermore, Libya’s oil exports were affected by the decision to seize the 
assets of the uncooperative British Petroleum, who previously owned the rights for 
60% of the Libyan oil resources. Gaddafi invoked this decision as means of 
punishment for Great Britain’s Middle Eastern policy which favoured Iran at the 
expense of the Arabs
19
. This sparked a commercial war with Great Britain who 
confiscated Libyan oil shipments in international waters and initiated legal 
procedures in Italy, the country where Libyan oil was refined before export
20
.  
It is in this climate of political and economical volatility in the Middle East 
that the first official contacts between the Arab Republic of Libya and the Socialist 
Republic of Romania were initiated. In January 1972, a delegation of 
representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and experts from the Ministry of 
Oil, Mines and Geology of Romania arrived to Tripoli at the invitation of the 
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Libyan Ministry of Economy. This delegation began new negotiations for the 
signing of trade and economic cooperation agreements between the two countries. 
The Libyans were interested in buying oil equipment, military hardware and 
constructing new housing facilities and administrative buildings, as well as 
factories, refineries, roads, naval ports and silos. The most imperative need for the 
Libyan economy was the lack of technical expertise from foreign engineers in 
order to accommodate the new ideological ambitions of the Revolution. In 
exchange for all of this, Romania would receive oil in excess of 3 million tons per 
year starting with 1972.  
But Bucharest was in no hurry to buy anything, having already settled the 
energetic necessities of the internal economy for 1972 from Algeria and Iran. They 
were looking for alternative sources for 1973 and, most importantly, prospective 
markets for exporting industrial goods. Given the fact that the consequences of the 
Oil Crisis were still in effect, with rising prices affecting the demand for oil, Libya 
was also pressured by the dispute concerning the rights for the revenues originating 
from the former British Petroleum oil fields. As the Libyans conditioned any future 
relations between the two countries to the immediate import of oil by the 
Romanians, Bucharest, at the delegation’s suggestion, decided to reduce the 
amount of oil imported from Iran. This was due to the fact that the Iranians 
demanded the oil be paid in US dollars, while the Libyans accepted a credit from 
Romanian state banks to be paid back in oil.  
The credit was undertaken in order to import technology and industrial 
goods, as well as long-term contracts for industrial complexes to be built by 
Romanian construction firms in Libya’s main cities. At that time, Great Britain 
boycotted the import of oil products from Romania; therefore the Romanian 
authorities’ hesitations were only regarding the technical aspects of delivering the 
high-density Libyan oil and not concerning potential repercussions from the British 
government-owned company
21
. 
However, amplification in relations between the two countries did not 
occur after this series of negotiations because of two events from 1972 which 
further compromised Romania’s image in Libya and in the Arab world in general. 
The first was the visit of Israeli prime-minister Golda Meir in Bucharest in May 
which, in addition to the events of August 1969, led the Arab League’s Central 
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Bureau for the Boycott of Israel in Damascus to start enquiring about Romanian 
companies
22
. The second was the takedown of a Libyan passenger plane by Israeli 
artillery above the Sinai which determined Arab leaders to call upon a boycott of 
any flight companies which land in Israel. This especially meant Romania’s 
TAROM which was the main carrier used by Jews who were immigrating to 
Israel
23
.  
Major Abdel Salaam Jalloud, Gaddafi’s right hand man, was in Romania in 
April 1972 in an improvised state visit at the time when the international press 
leaked the news that Golda Meir was officially invited to Romania
24
. This and the 
events that followed determined Jalloud, who was prime-minister in the summer of 
1973, to cancel communicating president Gaddafi’s invitation for Nicolae 
Ceauescu to visit Libya. Jalloud took this decision after the Romanian authorities 
refused to break-off relations with Israel. Eventually, Bucharest found out from 
diplomatic sources that Gaddafi was interested in meeting Ceauescu  and, in 
December the same year, they sent Mircea Malia, renowned scientist and 
diplomat, to present the Libyan president with a letter from Ceauescu
25
.  The 
letter contained Romania’s position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict which 
called upon Israel’s withdrawal from the occupied territories, an end to hostilities 
and affirmed the Palestinian people’s right to national determination and to be 
included in eventual political negotiations
26
.  
Trade relations were also affected by the events of 1972-1973. Taking the 
example of Iraq, the Libyan government attempted to influence negotiations with 
Bucharest by giving ultimatums, at a time when Romania’s position in the Arab 
World was precarious. They ceased delivery of crude oil in the spring of 1973 in 
order to force the Romanian side to concede further benefits in other contracts such 
as the ones for cement acquisition
27
. During this time, Colonel Gaddafi was 
undertaking a second unification project with Tunisia and negotiating for a less 
formal union with Egypt
28
. The Romanian MFA tried to influence Tripoli’s 
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position by talks with their Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts. This sparked 
hostility from Libyan representatives who threatened to further reveal Bucharest’s 
diplomatic duplicity to the rest of the Arab Community. The cooperation 
eventually resumed as political relations warmed up, establishing an “oil for 
machinery and installations” program. Therefore, Romania profited from the 
British Petroleum dispute, continuing to place its rising industrial production on a 
receptive market in exchange for oil that was unattractive to wealthier western 
buyers
29
.  
Relations develop and become personal 
As the Israeli victory in the October War left Arab countries in a state of 
disagreement regarding what to do next, the Romanian government endeavoured to 
expand its Middle Eastern policy. Relations with Syria and Sudan were re-
established and the ones with Egypt and Iraq improved. To build upon these 
achievements, the Romanian president went on a diplomatic tour in February 1974 
in Libya, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. This was the first official encounter between 
Gaddafi and Ceauescu and marked the official establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the two countries on February 14
th
 1974. During the visit, the 
two leaders signed an Agreement for economic and technical cooperation in the 
fields of oil, construction, agriculture, transports and shipping as well as a General 
Accord of Cooperation between Libya and Romania and a Common Communiqué. 
The latter reasserted Romania’s position towards the Middle Eastern conflict as 
well as the joint condemnation of racism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and 
imperialism in Africa
30
.  
In April 1974, the Romanian embassy in Tripoli was inaugurated with 
Aurel Turbceanu as chargé d’affaires en pied – a precursor to the resident 
ambassador Nicolae Verde, who followed in autumn the same year. In the 
summer of the following year Libya opened its embassy in Bucharest with Yahia 
Zakaria as resident ambassador
31
.  
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After the initial first encounter between the two leaders – Muammar 
Gaddafi and Nicolae Ceauescu – most of the subsequent lower level negotiations 
were based upon verbal agreements settled by top level discussions. This practice 
was meant to smooth relations in contentious issues such as the price of oil, credit 
interest or delivery terms for products. Despite the fact that both Gaddafi and 
Ceauescu’s foreign policies were founded more and more on personal 
diplomacy
32
, the exponential growth of trade and cultural ties intended was 
improbable. This was mainly due to a continuous rupture between the top 
leadership and the grass-roots reality in both countries.  
Most of what was agreed or proposed wasn’t technically or logistically 
feasible. The Romanian side offered extremely low prices for hypothetically high 
quality goods and services
33
. Tripoli continuously demanded additional 
concessions causing delays, shortages or disputes in the realisation of the new 
Libyan infrastructure by Romanian companies
34
. When the inevitable problems 
surfaced, the Libyans blocked payments and the Romanians couldn’t carry on their 
contracts
35
. Much to the frustration of the middle management from both countries, 
Libyan-Romanian trade was a sinuous process. However, the two leaders 
considered all these issues to be minor setbacks on the road to a close and 
equitable relationship between the two nations
36
. Ideology overshadowed 
pragmatism, thus explaining why inefficient contracts were perpetuated and 
restructured instead of liquidated.  
In the style of personal diplomacy, private visits between the two leaders 
became synonymous with state visits. The issues were settled upon by Ceauescu 
and Gaddafi during protocol events while the lower ranking leaders materialized 
their decisions in contracts and agreements. A critical moment for this state of 
affairs occurred in September 1981, when, during a hunting party organised by the 
Romanian government for Gaddafi and his acolytes, the Libyan leader’s Head of 
Security was accidentally killed by a Romanian official. Given that he was also a 
cousin of Gaddafi
37
, the visit was abruptly cancelled and everything agreed upon 
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during that visit was scrapped, including fixed oil prices, infrastructure plans and 
new trade deals
38
.  
Oil and politics
For both leaderships, pursuing and maintaining the relationship had a 
specific purpose. Initially, the Romanian authorities were looking for potential 
markets for their industrial products, but their focus eventually shifted towards 
establishing a stable and reliable energy source. For the Libyans, Bucharest was a 
source of technical expertise, additionally becoming a dependable political partner 
in the quest for an Arab alternative to socialism. While the main objectives 
remained throughout the two decades, secondary objectives arose gradually, 
overshadowing the commercial relationship of “oil for machinery and 
installations”. 
Romania began expanding its foreign policy to the Middle East in the early 
1960’s, before the longevity of its national reserves and previous arrangements 
proved insufficient
39
. The Bucharest government aimed at establishing a large 
scale industrial system, thus beginning the search for new markets with low 
competition from western or Soviet products. As the initial commercial policy 
grew, so did its industrial basis, eventually reaching a point where existing energy 
arrangements wouldn’t suffice
40
. However, there was a transition period from 1965 
to 1969, where oil contracts with countries such as Iran, Algeria, Iraq or Libya 
were seen as gestures of good faith in the spirit of mutually advantageous trade. 
Another reason was to ensure profitability for Romanian exports in developing 
countries that possessed no other consistent means of payment.  
After 1971, when Romania’s foreign and commercial policies started to 
grow exponentially, so did the price of oil. The Oil Crisis of 1971-1973, caused by 
Iranian and Libyan ambitions, had an effect on the Romanian economy as well. 
Fuel shortages caused temporary shutdown of production sectors, as well as 
domestic consumption disturbances
41
. For the communist system in Romania to 
survive both economically and politically, the authorities got further involved in 
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world diplomacy. As the Romanian government attempted to escape the Soviet 
sphere of influence by getting close to the US, they tried to acquire the Israeli 
lobby
42
.  
However, the main objective of engaging the West jeopardized the trade 
system established in the Arab World, as well as the viability of the industrial 
system at home. Arab League officials and national governments decried the 
Romanian-Israeli connection and began sporadic boycott measures, designed to 
force the political leaders to abandon the ambivalent foreign policy
43
. The 
Ceauescu regime started to respond to criticism by promoting neutrality as the 
main driving force of Romanian diplomacy but neither the Arabs, nor the Israeli 
and American camps decreased their pressure
44
.  
Bucharest tried to stay ahead of the boycotts by an extensive negotiations 
campaign throughout the Arab World and beyond. By the middle of the 1970’s, 
Romania’s foreign policy was at a point where getting involved in mediating the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was inevitable
45
. The boycott had reached a maximum and the 
political and economic concessions made by Bucharest to Arab countries were 
upsetting Tel Aviv
46
. But the peace process wasn’t well received in the Muslim 
World and Romania’s image deteriorated further
47
.  
Gaddafi’s Libya had only one important resource – petroleum, and a huge 
disadvantage compared with the other neighbouring states – a very small 
population
48
. Therefore, the only way to achieve any of the ambitious, 
ideologically-charged projects was to maximize profit and political capital by way 
of oil transactions. But in order to pursue any agenda, the revolutionary 
government had to take control of the privatized oil fields from British, American 
and Italian companies
49
. In the tense diplomatic climate that followed the 
nationalization measures, Tripoli’s new leadership couldn’t reverse its position 
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without succumbing politically. Therefore, Colonel Gaddafi decided to use the 
newly found notoriety to manipulate world oil prices, in synchronization with Iran, 
Algeria and other energy players. This gave rise to the First Oil Crisis
50
. To escape 
the diplomatic isolation and relative economic constraints, the Libyan Arab 
Republic had to replace the western-operated installations and to find new 
technical support if large scale production was ever to bring the expected income. 
For this they initially turned to the former colonial power – Italy. However, the 
British and American pressured Rome and led to serious losses by the Libyan 
state
51
.  
They eventually approached Romania due to its reputation as a traditional 
supplier of oil installations, as well as extensive technical expertise in the field of 
exploration and exploitation. This expertise was the only major bargaining chip 
that Bucharest had in discussions with Tripoli, but the fact that the Romania was 
not as susceptible to the oil prices’ fluctuations as were other industrial players was 
also an advantage in the negotiations
52
. The relation proved mutually beneficial, in 
spite of the setbacks previously mentioned. This was mainly due to Libya’s 
developing potential and Gaddafi’s eccentricity. The latter left many western 
companies unwilling to deal with him and his representatives, allowing the 
Romanians to place their counteroffer on anything from construction to 
automobiles, foodstuff, textiles and even weapons
53
.  
Gaddafi’s plans to transform Libya into a great power meant that the 
country had to become a major energy player, not just a crude oil supplier. The 
British Petroleum affair had made refining in Sicily a potentially risky endeavour. 
Thus, the Libyan government had to acquire their own refining technology, as well 
as find reliable markets unaffected by the British and American political pressure. 
They inevitably turned towards the Eastern Bloc, in the pursuit for quasi-
permanent supply arrangements. The project intended to build a pipeline from a 
Yugoslav port in the Adriatic Sea, across Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, to 
the USSR. The negotiations for the “Adriatic” pipeline were stalled by the 
different agendas of each player involved. Most of them were hesitant to invest in 
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the pipeline’s infrastructure, while emphatically requesting advantageous oil 
prices, guaranteed by Tripoli for at least 10 years. But the experience of the Oil 
Crisis made Gaddafi unwilling to bind the oil price to any long-term contract, 
regardless of other benefits. Therefore, the pipeline project was abandoned and 
Libya renegotiated separate, short-term contracts with each of the Eastern Bloc 
states
54
.  
The Romanian government refused any participation in the “Adriatic” 
project from the beginning, preferring bilateral negotiations in detriment to any 
arrangement which would further bind it economically to the other communist 
states
55
. Moreover, Bucharest attempted to become an autonomous energy player 
in its own right, by use of technical expertise, diplomatic efforts and other 
economic issues they could use as leverage in negotiations.  
The Romanian authorities expressed interest in the Iranian projects for a 
pipeline into Europe through Turkey as a result of a much closer political and 
economical relationship with Teheran. Also, Iran’s reputation of being an 
American ally meant that this would also be a step in the intended direction of 
drifting apart from the Soviet bloc. In parallel with these negotiations, Bucharest 
was courted by both Iran
56
 and Libya to build and equip refineries in these 
countries, as alternatives to refining abroad. However, the Misurata refinery in 
Libya wasn’t even initiated and neither was the Iranian one due to the fact that the 
technology available to the Romanian companies was outdated, with some former 
clients like Portugal or Pakistan complaining of inefficiency
57
.  
Given that many other players tried to take advantage of the political and 
military tensions in the Middle East by overpricing alternative solutions to the pre-
existing oil routes, Romania preferred to utilize another technological advantage – 
its fleet of oil tankers
58
. In spite of difficulties, Bucharest had sufficient ships and 
enough perceived political neutrality to continue shipments even during hostilities 
in the wake of the October War
59
.  
This experience convinced Libyan authorities that a partnership with 
Romania could be beneficial for them in ensuring continued shipments of Libyan 
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oil to other markets. Therefore, the Libyan-Romanian naval shipping company 
ROLISHIP was created in 1976 in the Romanian port of Constana, beginning its 
operations in 1979. Despite being one of the more successful business enterprises 
between the two countries, ROLISHIP mainly operated commercial ventures 
between Libya and Romania, as well as contracts initiated by the governments of 
Tripoli and Bucharest in other countries
60
. However, the shipping company also 
generated disputes between the two parties, causing setbacks as well as 
administrative restructuring
61
. ROLISHIP was eventually liquidated after 1990, as 
were most of the foreign trade ventures of communist Romania. 
Libya only became the central focus of Bucharest’s energy policy after the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979, which overthrew Ceauescu’s main Middle Eastern 
ally – Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran. Up to then, Iran provided most of 
Romania’s oil, being the seventh foreign trade partner
62
. But as the new 
establishment of Tehran was analyzing the wisdom of continuing its relations with 
Romania, Tripoli seemed the only reliable and stable economic partner, unaffected 
by any connection to Israel. Moreover, Gaddafi’s close relations with the Islamic 
State had the potential of mending the communist government’s reputation in 
Iran
63
. 
In light of the new economic disturbances caused by the Oil Crisis of 1979, 
Romania’s leadership decided to pursue, with even more determination, the idea of 
becoming a major destination for refining crude oil. This would have involved 
foreign investment in Romania, as well as priority in acquiring petroleum products. 
Thus, they started negotiations with governments and private companies for the 
future investment and participation in the Black Sea Petrochemical Complex. This 
was supposed to be the largest refining system in Europe and was intended to 
process most of the oil exports designated for the continent.  
Many oil producing countries were approached to participate, either as a 
cofounder or a supplier, but so were many international petroleum companies for 
their technological expertise and as a guarantee of quality. Libya was one of the 
states with which negotiations were initiated. However, the project wasn’t 
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considered attractive by any of the major oil producing nations, nor for western oil 
companies. The Petrochemical Complex was eventually built and operated at a 
diminished capacity. Its activity was a result of particular contracts, not long-term 
strategic supply agreements as initially designed. Libya’s traditional objection 
towards large-scale projects was invoked again, the authorities refusing any kind of 
stabilization of oil prices
64
.  
The biggest western oil companies were hesitant to sign any new contracts 
with the North African country after the nationalizations of the early 1970’s. In 
order for Tripoli to expand oil production to new areas they began to attract 
Eastern European companies. In May of 1980, Libya’s National Oil Corporation 
signed a 25 year contract with Romania’s Rompetrol, for exploration of new oil 
perimeters in the south-western desert, near an area under exploration by 
Bulgaria’s Geocom. The terms of the contract stipulated that the risk was entirely 
attributed to the Romanian side, in exchange for a right to 15% of the discovered 
quantity
65
. The performance of the two Eastern Bloc companies was negligible for 
the 16 years of exploration. Nevertheless, Rompetrol, as well as other new players, 
were needed especially after the 1986 withdrawal of all American companies and 
personnel from Libya
66
. In 1990, the new authorities in Bucharest decided to end 
Rompetrol’s involvement with Tripoli. An agreement was signed, transferring the 
rights and obligations to a consortium comprised of Spain’s Repsol Oil, France’s 
Total and Austria’s OMV
67
.  
Pariah states
Both Colonel Gaddafi and Nicolae Ceauescu had personal and national 
ambitions in the attempt to place their countries on the political and economic 
world stage. However, the evolution of the Cold War and the Middle Eastern 
situation towards de-escalation was not beneficial to either of the two states. 
In Romania’s case, its dissidence from the USSR was the starting point of 
its closeness with the West, while its involvement in the Middle East was meant to 
ensure diplomatic and economic visibility throughout the Third World. 
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Ceauescu’s role in the Israeli-Arab peace process should have been the peak of 
this campaign however, his contribution was deemed minimal in the grand scheme 
by the Western Bloc
68
. Moreover, Romania’s association with Israel and Egypt 
was detrimental to the rest of Bucharest’s foreign policy in the Middle East
69
. Tel 
Aviv gradually diminished its partnership with Romania after the mediation 
objective was already achieved through other, more important parties such as the 
US, Morocco or Pakistan
70
. As a consequence, the pro-Bucharest lobby in 
Washington vanished. Ceauescu’s Romania became more and more unimportant 
as the détente between East and West progressed. The Reagan administration 
eventually withdrew the “most favoured nation clause” in 1987 on the grounds of 
reported human rights violations
71
.  
In parallel, the national economy was collapsing because of looming 
foreign debt and obsolete technology. Romanian exports lost any competitive edge 
that they held while Bucharest was an important diplomatic player. Low-quality 
goods and services were turned down by western buyers and were being 
channelled mostly towards Third World economies that were willing to receive 
them but were unreliable buyers
72
. Thus, with economic downfall and further 
diplomatic isolation, Romania became a de facto pariah state in the eyes of the 
West, a far cry from the ideological ambition of becoming a leader of the 
Nonalignment movement.  
However, throughout the difficult 1980’s, Libyan-Romanian relations 
remained intense and the relationships between the two leaders flourished. As 
Gaddafi’s economic and political ambitions of Arab Unity failed repeatedly, he 
pursued a national and regional ambition by way of enhancing Libya’s military 
capacity
73
. He courted any and all weapons producers in the attempt to overcome 
the numerical weakness of his military and paramilitary forces. The main supplier 
was the USSR, eager to discard outdated technology in exchange for oil dollars
74
. 
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The Libyan leader also contacted other Soviet Bloc states such as Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Poland, Romania, and even Yugoslavia
75
.  
Bucharest was a weapons manufacturer of medium size, present mostly in 
the Third World countries, the biggest consumers of weapons. Romania and Libya 
signed a military agreement in 1983, through which Bucharest delivered weapons, 
vehicles and explosives for infantry
76
. But Tripoli’s interest was extended to all 
categories of military equipment, as well as instruction techniques for its air force, 
police and armoured divisions. The Libyans were even interested in investing in 
Romania’s development and production of weapons, munitions and helicopters
77
. 
As Gaddafi’s ambitions grew, he began taunting the West by supporting 
and funding all types of terrorist groups, whom he saw as instruments of political 
and ideological pressure. However, his standoff with the US reached its peak in 
1985 after Libyan authorities were involved in planning and supplying the 
explosives for a terrorist attack in West Berlin that killed several American 
soldiers
78
. Washington’s reaction was firm, with a large-scale bombing campaign 
in Libya’s major cities. The aim was to make a display of force in order to deter 
Gaddafi from further actions.  
But the measure had the unexpected effect of mending Libya’s 
international reputation, especially in the eyes of the Muslim World. State officials 
throughout the Third World condemned the American aggression and supported 
Gaddafi’s regime as the clear victim of Cold War bullying
79
. Romania’s state-run 
press agency Agerpress expressed the public opinion’s concern about the 
escalation of events in the Mediterranean due to the US’s bombing campaign
80
. 
Gaddafi responded to the US raid by reiterating the 1978 threat of adhering to the 
Warsaw Pact Treaty. However, the Soviet Union’s leaders were unwilling to 
jeopardise the détente and their country’s security by associating with the bellicose 
Arab dictator
81
.  
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Romania had been warned by Washington in 1985 to cease any military 
shipments to Tripoli or risk being labelled as supporting terrorism
82
. This may 
have contributed to the further deterioration of Bucharest’s relations with the US. 
Moreover, in the second half of the 1980’s, Ceauescu met several times with 
terrorist leaders such as Abu Nidal or militant Fatah members
83
. Gaddafi’s support 
for terrorists diminished in visibility after 1986 and, after the international 
condemnation for the Lockerbie incident in 1988, apparently stopped directly 
organizing other terrorist acts
84
. However, in the last days of Ceauescu’s regime 
unidentified professional gunmen terrorised the population in the hope of 
extinguishing the anti-regime protests. Some of the revolutionaries later pointed at 
Ceauescu’s relations with the infamous, terrorist-funding regime of colonel 
Gaddafi as a possible answer
85
.  
In parallel with the arms procurement strategy, the Libyan leadership tried 
to obtain nuclear technology under the slogan of achieving energy sustainability. 
Tripoli aimed every possible lead in the struggle to create its own nuclear weapon 
as a possible deterrent against any foreign threat, but also as a major pressure point 
in negotiations with neighbours and other powers
86
. In December 1981, a Libyan 
delegation led by the secretary of nuclear energy, Abdel Magid Al-Kaud, met in 
Bucharest with Romania’s Cornel Mihulcea, the president of the State Committee 
for Nuclear Energy. The delegation expressed the Libyan government’s 
willingness to finance and participate in any nuclear research project or endeavour 
undertaken by Bucharest
87
.  
Tripoli’s terrorist activities and nuclear program brought on western 
economic sanctions against Libya. The US-lead campaign hoped to either force 
Gaddafi’s hand in giving up his ambitions, or to obtain the collapse of his entire 
regime
88
. The political, military, commercial and technological pursuits of the two 
regimes led to situations close to bankruptcy.  
As Ceauescu’s intense foreign policy relied on trading technology and 
industrial products, Romania took up several international loans. Although external 
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trade had a comfortable surplus up to 1970, the Arab League’s boycott and the 
dictator’s expanding ambitions further postponed paying back the loans. Through 
1980 to 1982, the country’s foreign trade deteriorated due to rising oil prices and 
creditors decided to push forward the starting point for payments. Ceauescu 
decided to expedite paying back all the loans before 1990 in order to regain the 
country’s economic independence. All the national production was prioritized for 
export. Food and energy shortages led to popular unrest and the eventual collapse 
of the communist regime in the wake of the 1989 anti-communist revolutionary 
movement throughout Europe
89
.  
Unlike the fate of the Romanian dictator, Colonel Gaddafi benefited from 
the vast oil resources at his disposal, managing to partially elude the embargo. In 
spite of grandiose and costly infrastructure projects such as “The Great Man-Made 
River”, Libya did not fall into economic collapse
90
. It was not the impact of the 
western sanctions that convinced Gaddafi to abandon his arms race with the US, 
but the fate of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1991, when the entire international 
community turned against him
91
. The impact of isolation convinced him, in 1999, 
to accept disarmament and hand over the two suspects from the Lockerbie 
bombing, thus rejoining the international community
92
. However, his main 
advantage was the lack of popular unrest during the embargo, the Libyan nation 
supporting his foreign policy in the face of imminent war
93
.  
  
Conclusions 
  
The two regimes were products of the geopolitical situation of the post-war period. 
Their inevitable interaction was the result of convergent national interests and 
objectives, as well as the pro-active determination of the two leaders. The relations 
between the two countries evolved in an ideologically-charged manner, divergent 
from the grass-roots reality which was incompatible with the visions of Gaddafi 
and Ceauescu. 
                                                
89
 Dinu C. Giurescu (ed.), op. cit., pp. 723-731. 
90
 Ronald Bruce St John (ed.), op. cit., pp. 278-280. 
91
 Niblock Al Rachid, “Irak, Libye, Soudan : efficacité des sanctions ?”, Politique étrangère, no. 1, 
2000, pp. 97-108. 
92
 Ronald Bruce St John (coord.), op. cit., p. 306. 
93
 David Blundy, Andrew Lycett, op. cit., pp. 210-218. 
.*2)3E	<=	

58 
The closeness of the two heads of state influenced and even directed the 
course of their economic, political and military interactions. Both regimes evolved 
in a way that would oppose them to other global or regional powers. In such 
moments of crisis the authorities in Tripoli and Bucharest supported each other, 
while also attempting to transform the other’s disadvantage into an opportunity. 
For Romania, Libya was one of the most stable and reliable partnerships, 
especially from an economic point of view. For Libya, Romania was a good 
example in ideological, economical and political development, Gaddafi admiring 
his European ally. The two regimes represent controversial and exotic pieces in the 
Cold War jigsaw. Their interdependence makes analyzing the two countries 
together, through the perspective of their relationship, a pertinent endeavor.  
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